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Abstract: In this paper, a case study about a microdata anonymization test is presented. The work has 
been made considering a French administrative health dataset with indirect identifiers and sensitive 
variables about hospital stays. Two approaches to build a k-anonymized file are described, and 
software used in the test are compared. 
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1 Introduction 
Following the “Free Health Data” petition launched by the French Inter-Associative Health 
Group CISS (Collectif Interassociatif Sur la Santé) in January 2013, the French Minister of 
Health and Solidarity Marisol Touraine asked P.L. Bras to write a report on health data use 
and governance. It was released in September 2013. The debate on increasing access to 
public health data was launched in late November 2013. M. Touraine commissioned F. Von 
Lennep, head of the statistical department of the Ministry of Health and Solidarity, and P. 
Burnel, responsible for IT System Strategies in the Ministry of Health and Solidarity, to lead 
the Open Data committee. The committee issued its conclusions in late April 2014. 
 
A taskforce leaded by André Loth, project manager in the statistical department of the 
Ministry of Health and Solidarity, was launched to assess data safety and individual re-
identification risk in health data. Its work focused on health data specifics, anonymization 
techniques, and how a wider access to health data could be organized. In order to get 
practical perspectives, the taskforce launched a test on real data. The aim was to determine 
how anonymized data files could be built from the original French exhaustive administrative 
database on hospital stays. The objective of this work is to specify a suitable method for 
producing anonymized microdata files to be released as public use files. A wide range of 
different users is expected to use these data files: from citizens to health insurers, including 
pharmaceutical companies, doctors… 
 
Our work fell into a binding timetable due to organizational and legal constraints. The 
French Commission for Data Protection and Liberties (Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés) gave its agreement on January 30th, 2014, for a three-month 
renewable period. The test began in early March 2014 because of late availability of data and 
needed nomenclatures. Test conclusions were given in late April 2014. 
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This paper aims at presenting and comparing two ways to elaborate a safe microdata file on 
this case study. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
software used for the test, µ-Argus and ARX. In Section 3 test data are introduced and we 
present objectives of the anonymization process in terms of disclosure risk and allowed 
technical solutions to reduce it. Section 4 presents two approaches tested to reach 
anonymization goals. A discussion is led in Section 5 and some conclusions are given in 
Section 6. 
2 Data Anonymization Tools  
The result of de-identification tools market browsing has shown that there is a wide range of 
solutions developed for structured data anonymization offering a long list of functionalities. 
But few of them are used or can be smartly used (because they are internal to specific 
organizations or developed by researchers for specific use).  
 
Moreover, practical applicability of the promising functions needs to be tested, in particular 
to highlight what has to be refined, updated or further developed to enhance the usability. 
 
Of course these tools are different from those used for masking data that we do not consider 
in this paper, because they only manipulate direct identifiers by creating pseudonyms or 
applying randomization techniques, but never deal with indirect identifiers and thus do not 
provide suitable protection.  
Some of those de-identification tools and some of their features are summarized in Table A.1 
in Appendix.  
 
We can observe that there are few interesting commercial products whereas there are several 
tools and prototypes developed by academic researchers not broadly used. To further study 
the usability, the robustness of these tools and privacy protection they can provide, a testing 
process on real data of significant size needs to be performed. In the two next subsections, 
we will introduce the software used in the test, µ-Argus and ARX. Further comparison is 
also given in Section 5. 
2.1 µ-Argus 
 
µ-Argus is a software package developed to help statisticians to anonymize microdata files. 
It is a deliverable of the European CASC (Computational Aspects of Statistical 
Confidentiality) project that took place between 2000 and 2003, and additional work has 
been made since 2003 thanks to other European projects: the Centre of Excellence SDC 
(CENEX-SDC), ESSNet-harmonization and ESSNet-SDC. The next major release of µ-
Argus will be an open-source version; development is still in progress (see de Wolf (2013) 
for more details). 
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Many protection methods can be used with µ-Argus. The anonymization scheme can be 
summarized in a few steps: 
- Import microdata into µ-Argus and define metadata before beginning the statistical 
disclosure control (SDC) process. In this step we must for instance define the 
indirect identifiers and the sensitive variables of the microdata file. 
- Estimation of the disclosure risk of the file. It is possible to set a minimum threshold 
for specified combinations of values of indirect identifiers. In the risk estimation you 
can also, in case of a survey, use the sampling weights in order to probabilistically 
estimate the re-identification risk. 
- Several protection methods to reduce disclosure risk are implemented in the 
software: they are perturbative (noise addition, microaggregation, post-
randomization method (PRAM), rounding, data swapping…) or not (global 
recoding, local suppression…). For a further description of µ-Argus features see 
Hundepool (2008). 
- After residual disclosure risk estimation, safe microdata files can be exported. 
 
µ-Argus is an interactive program mostly used by National Statistical Institutes (NSIs). A 
questionnaire on SDC tools led in the European NSIs in 2013 has shown that µ-Argus is 
often used for microdata protection in an automated way, even if some institutes are still 
applying manual procedures or homemade tools. 
 
2.2 ARX 
 
ARX Data Anonymization Tool is an open source data anonymization framework developed 
in Java. It implements dedicated optimizations for anonymization algorithms. It encodes data 
in a way that allows evaluating transformations efficiently. ARX is available online1. See 
also Kohlmayer and Prasser (2012). 
 
ARX is a flexible and intuitive high-performance data anonymization tool. It implements a 
wide variety of common privacy criteria such as k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, δ-
presence and their combinations. See Sweeney (2002), Machanavajjhala (2007), Li (2007) 
and Nergiz (2007) for more information about these concepts. ARX allows protecting a 
dataset from a multitude of privacy threats. It allows non-domain-experts to specify privacy 
guarantees in an intuitive manner and to explore potentially large solution spaces efficiently. 
It implements also a set of metrics to evaluate information loss. 
 
The ARX graphical tool is composed of three main perspectives (views). The first one 
allows defining the required privacy guarantees. The second perspective allows browsing the 
complete solution space according to the privacy criteria defined on the first perspective. 
Solutions that fulfill the criteria as well as the “optimal” solution are highlighted. The third 
perspective allows comparing transformed datasets to the original dataset.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 It can be downloaded from http://arx.deidentifier.org  
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The ARX anonymization scheme could be summarized in the following steps: 
- Import the original dataset in CSV format. 
- Define direct identifiers, indirect identifiers and sensitive variables of the original 
dataset. 
- Define the privacy criteria. For instance 10-anonymity for indirect identifiers, 3-
diversity for the sensitive variable, … 
- Define generalization hierarchies for each indirect identifier. ARX allows importing 
generalization hierarchies (nomenclatures) or creating new ones from an interactive 
menu. 
- Define the maximum number of outliers that can be tolerated and will be suppressed. 
- Start the anonymization process. 
- Browse and analyze solutions. 
- Export desired transformations. 
3 The Test Framework 
3.1 The Dataset to Anonymize 
 
The anonymization test is performed with the French dataset PMSI (Programme de 
Médicalisation des Systèmes d’Information). This exhaustive medical-administrative file 
contains more than 35 million records corresponding to all hospital stays for one calendar 
year in the three major hospitalization areas: MCO (médecine, chirurgie, obstétrique or 
MSO: medicine, surgery and obstetrics) also known as short stays, rehabilitation care and 
home hospitalization. 
 
For our test, consistently with the desired output file, we experiment on the latest PMSI-
MCO file that contains short stays. Besides, the working group decides to focus on “unique” 
stays, in other words hospital stays except medical sessions (e.g. chemotherapy or dialysis 
sessions) that generally happen more than once a year. The underlying reason is that there 
are different ways for encoding doctors to fill in information about medical sessions: they are 
allowed to create one record for each stay or one for all. As such, interpretation of these stays 
is hard and it is difficult to deal with them in the anonymization process: for instance the 
variable “length of stay” is very volatile because of the different possibilities for health 
workers to fill in data: this can create fake anonymization issues. 
 
All things considered, we deal with the 2012 PMSI-MCO file excluding medical sessions. 
The dataset contains 20.6 million hospital stays. For each stay detailed medical information 
(notably major diagnosis, related and accompanying diagnoses, medical procedures, care 
areas) and administrative information (hospital identification number FINESS2, dates of stay, 
admission and discharge modes, patient birth date, sex and residential area) are provided. 
The FINESS number is public information since it is released on a dedicated website3, and 
                                                 
2
 FIchier National des Établissements Sanitaires et Sociaux or National file of the sanitory and social 
establishments 
3
 See http://finess.sante.gouv.fr/jsp/index.jsp  
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enables one to find the name, location, legal status and type of a hospital. Each record (i.e. 
each stay) is classified into one GHM4 code (the French version of DRG, Diagnosis Related 
Group) that is derived from medical data and in a way sums up the pathology for which the 
patient is hospitalized. The most aggregated level of the GHM classification is the CMD5 
(Major category of diagnosis), which is a 28-item nomenclature including one code for 
medical sessions and one error code.  
 
First of all we asked health experts what the most used classification for health studies 
currently is, in order to maximize data utility of anonymized files and to ensure consistency 
with other datasets already disseminated. For example, it is very common to classify age in 
five-year age groups.  
 
Before beginning the anonymization process, we have analyzed our dataset (distributions of 
the variables, health experts requirements) in order to see the variables (and their related 
items) that are rare and as such likely to lie behind anonymization issues. Hospital stays are 
uncommon among children between 1 and 14 years old in particular (see Figure 1 below). 
Concerning admission and discharge variables, origins and destinations other than home, 
unknown or regular transfers are quite unusual and death is in addition particularly sensitive 
(see Figure 1 below). Likewise, we find a few long hospital stays (more than one week). 
Lastly, distance between residential and hospitalization areas has a strong power of re-
identification: patients whose residential area is not in the same territory as their hospital are 
in general easy to disclose. We take one random example with the first (by alphabetic order) 
French department (Ain) with population of about 600 000 inhabitants: for 43% of hospital 
stays in Ain the patient also lives in the department. Conversely, 86 combinations of Ain-
other department (out of a total of 100 combinations) consist in less than 10 hospital stays.  
 
                                                 
4
 Groupe Homogène de Maladie 
5
 Catégorie Majeure de Diagnostic 
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Figure 1 Univariate analyses about indirect identifiers 
3.2 Objectives of the Anonymization Process 
 
The anonymization task consists in obtaining a dataset that reaches k-anonymity and l-
diversity given that we address exhaustive data. We recall the definitions of these concepts 
below. 
 
Definition 1 k-anonymity 
A file is said to be k-anonymized if at least k records match every combination of values 
taken by the indirect identifiers. Each combination is called an identification key. 
 
Definition 2 l-diversity 
A file is said to be l-diverse if for each identification key, there are at least l “well 
represented” different values for each sensitive attribute. 
 
The taskforce about the anonymization test decided that neither perturbative methods nor 
local suppression were suitable in order to obtain the safe file. We have considered that using 
perturbative methods may increase risk of misuse, especially with non-specialist users. 
Moreover we agreed on the idea that local suppression may lead to bad interpretation of the 
data so local suppression was not allowed either. In the ARX scenario, outliers with a high 
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risk of re-identification are computed, and there is post-processing in order to deal with them 
without deleting these risky records or using local suppression: see also Section 4.2. 
 
We use the following variables as indirect identifiers: 
- Sex 
- Age 
- Residential area (ZIP code) 
- Hospitalization area (FINESS number) 
- Length of hospital stay 
 
For the µ-Argus scenario, we consider two other indirect identifiers to ensure k-anonymity: 
- Admission mode 
- Discharge mode 
 
We also check the variable “Major category of diagnosis” (CMD: Catégorie Majeure de 
Diagnostic) for l-diversity. This is an aggregated version of the main diagnosis recorded 
during the patient stay. This variable has 26 modalities for all stays considered in the 
anonymization test. As previously indicated, repeated medical sessions are excluded from 
the test, there is a specific CMD code for medical sessions that we do not consider 
afterwards. There is no error code in the dataset. 
 
The objective of the anonymization process is to obtain at the end a 10-anonymised and 3-
diverse file. A modality is said “well represented” (for l-diversity) if there is at least one 
record with the considered modality. Definition of such levels was done after a long 
discussion: these levels were decided in a way both cautious and reasonable… A value of 
k= 5 is often used for some health data dissemination; we chose k= 10 to ensure a security 
margin, for instance if the potential attacker uses auxiliary information to deconstruct the 
anonymization process. Moreover, it is theoretically easier to get 3-diversity with a 10-
anonymized file than a 5-anonymized one. For more details about the choice of k in the SDC 
process see El Emam (2009). The choice of l= 3 aims at avoiding exact disclosure of the 
sensitive variable “Major category of diagnosis”. 
4 Results of the Experiment 
Two ways to create a safe file were proposed during the test. In this section we will present 
two different approaches to elaborate a file regarded as safe given the anonymization goals 
introduced in Section 3. We will in the next Section compare the two methods and also 
software used to build the anonymized files. 
Given we want to obtain a safe file without any local suppression or use of perturbative 
methods, the only approach to reach k-anonymization and l-diversity is global recoding. The 
first step in preliminary work was to discuss with users of the PMSI file and domain experts 
in order to have predefined ways of recoding. The goal was to have an overview of “smart” 
plausible recoding if an expert in health data wants to make statistical studies with the 
protected file. For instance, studying children under 1 year old is a classical subject in 
pediatrics. The definition of possible ways of recoding is completed with the analysis of 
distributions of the indirect identifiers. 
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We also have reached the conclusion in the preliminary work that sampling should give 
additional protection in order to avoid residual disclosure risk. Yet the completeness of 
hospital stays is a major asset of the French PMSI file. 
 
4.1 µ-Argus: Using Global Recoding with an Iterative Approach  
 
In the first test scenario we produced safe files with µ-Argus. Here are the different steps: 
- After discussion with domain experts, definition of multiple predefined ways of 
recoding. 
- Calculation of frequencies for all identification keys. In order to limit the number of 
identification keys to compute some variables have to be discretized (e.g. age has 
been recoded to larger bands with a top coding, and ZIP codes are replaced by 
department - NUTS3 level). 
- For each modality of each variable, µ-Argus computes the number of identification 
keys with insufficient frequency where this modality is implied. According to these 
results we use a step-by-step approach: 
- While the file is not 10-anonymized, do: 
o Detect modalities that are implied in a big number of identification keys 
with less than 10 stays. Use the ratio between number of concerned 
identification keys and frequency of occurrence (the two numbers are given 
by µ-Argus) to detect “risky” modalities. 
o If it is possible from an analytic point of view given conclusions of 
discussion with health experts, combine this “risky” modality with an other 
one.  
o If not possible (for instance there is no sense in combining two geographical 
places that are not in the same area!), make another recoding: go back to the 
detection step. 
- When you obtain a 10-anonymized file, check for 3-diversity using a SAS algorithm. 
 
We have constructed two files using this empirical approach. Two files that are compatible 
with anonymization goals are described in Table 1 and Table 2. In the file of Table 1 there is 
no geographical dimension: we have tried to introduce the variable “Residential area” and 
we have obtained the file summarized in Table 2. 
 
Name of variable Type of variable Number of modalities 
Sex Indirect identifier 2 
Age Indirect identifier 18 
Length of hospital stay Indirect identifier 12 
Admission mode Indirect identifier 2 
Discharge mode Indirect identifier 2 
Major category of diagnosis Sensitive variable 26 
Table 1 One file that meets anonymization criteria without geographical dimension 
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Name of variable Type of variable Number of modalities 
Sex Indirect identifier 2 
Age Indirect identifier 6 
Residential area Indirect identifier 22 (NUTS2 level grouping overseas 
departments and combining Corsica and 
PACA6 regions) 
Length of hospital stay Indirect identifier 2 
Admission mode Indirect identifier 2 
Discharge mode Indirect identifier 2 
Major category of diagnosis Sensitive variable 26 
Table 2 One file that meets anonymization criteria with one geographical dimension 
 
The variable “hospitalization area” is not included in the two proposed files: it is hard to 
build such l-diverse file because some hospitals are specialized in the treatment of a 
particular disease, for instance cancer centers. Moreover a file with two geographical levels 
will a priori be very risky because hospital stays where residence and hospitalization areas 
are different are extremely rare: like already described in Section 3, this can easily lead to re-
identification. However we didn’t try to consider instead “hospitalization area” a variable 
that takes the modalities “hospitalization area is close to residential area” and 
“hospitalization area is far away from residential area”. This binary variable should reach a 
quite good trade-off between data utility and disclosure risk; it has not been tested here 
because of hard work needed to compute this variable. 
 
4.2 ARX: Two Levels of Detail Depending on Disclosure Risk of the Stay 
 
The second test has been implemented with the ARX Data Anonymization Tool. Privacy 
criteria are also 10-anonymity and 3-diversity. In ARX, we define first possible 
generalizations (i.e. ways of recoding) for each indirect identifier. Then ARX chooses a 
possible combination of those generalizations that fulfills the given privacy criteria.  
 
 
We use the following five variables as indirect identifiers: 
- Sex 
- Age 
- ZIP code of residential area 
- FINESS number 
- Length of hospital stay 
Note that admission and discharge modes are not studied in this anonymization scenario. 
 
The different steps of the test scenario could be summarized as follows: 
- Creation and loading of the dataset input. The ARX input file should be in CSV 
format. 
                                                 
6
 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur is a French region located in the south and close to Corsica. 
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- After loading the original dataset, indirect identifiers and sensitive attributes are 
defined. Indirect identifiers will be k-anonymized, and sensitive attributes will be l-
diversified. 
- For each indirect identifier attribute we import its corresponding generalization 
hierarchy, which defines a way of iteratively generalizing the values of an attribute. 
The generalization hierarchy should be monotonic, i.e. within one hierarchy the 
groups at level n+1 are built by merging groups from level n (see for instance Table 
A.2 and Table A.3 in Appendix). All levels of generalization are represented in 
Table 3. 
- Definition of anonymization criteria: 
o 10-anonymity for the five indirect identifiers 
o 3-diversity for the sensitive attribute “Major category of diagnosis” 
o Suppression threshold (percentage of outliers that can be globally 
suppressed) 
- Production of anonymized solutions. ARX searches all possible solutions by 
applying systematically all possible combinations of generalization hierarchies of 
indirect identifiers to check for anonymization criteria. 
 
 
Indirect 
identifier Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Sex Cleartext Not disseminated Not disseminated Not disseminated Not disseminated 
Age (years) Cleartext 
Five-year age 
groups  
(see Figure A.2) 
Level 2 
(see Figure A.2) 
Level 3 
(see Figure 
A.2) 
Not disseminated 
ZIP code of 
residence Cleartext 
NUTS3 (101 
departments in 
France)  
NUTS2 (22 
regions in 
Metropolitan 
France and 
overseas 
departments) 
NUTS2 level 
grouping 
overseas 
departments 
and combining 
Corsica and 
PACA regions  
Not disseminated 
FINESS 
number 
(hospitalization 
area) 
Cleartext 
NUTS3 (101 
departments in 
France) 
NUTS2 (22 
regions in 
Metropolitan 
France and 
overseas 
departments)  
NUTS2 level 
grouping 
overseas 
departments 
and combining 
Corsica and 
PACA regions  
Not disseminated 
Length of 
hospital stay 
(days) 
Cleartext Level 1 (see Figure A.3) 
Level 2 
(see Figure A.3) 
Not 
disseminated Not disseminated 
Table 3 Generalization levels in the ARX scenario 
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ARX allows defining tolerated suppression threshold i.e. the percentage of outliers (records 
allowed to be suppressed in order to fulfill the anonymization criteria) that are (globally) 
suppressed.  
 
Firstly we calculate possible solutions for the given anonymization criteria with no 
suppression (threshold= 0%). We obtain 127 solutions among 1000 combinations of 
generalization hierarchies (2 x 5 x 5 x 5 x 4). There is no solution where at least one indirect 
identifier is not completely anonymized (the variable is suppressed). Like for the first test 
scenario, solutions with no suppression suffer from a high loss of utility. Table 4 gives an 
overview of a possible solution. Information about “hospitalization area” and “length of 
hospital stay” are not disseminated in order to fulfill anonymization criteria. 
 
Name of variable Type of variable Level of generalization 
Sex Indirect identifier Cleartext 
Age Indirect identifier Five-year age groups (level 1) 
Residential area Indirect identifier NUTS3 level 
Major category of diagnosis Sensitive variable Cleartext 
Table 4 One combination that meets anonymization criteria in the ARX scenario 
 
 
It is therefore interesting to create files with consideration of the outliers. To do this, we 
apply the following methodology in order to obtain a 10-anonymized and 3-diverse file: 
- Set the maximum threshold of (globally suppressed) outliers to a positive value (4% 
in this test), and then select one solution. 
- Extract outliers, i.e. a set of records that do not fulfill the anonymization criteria 
- Reprocessing deleted records. It corresponds to replay the anonymization process on 
deleted records. 
- Construct the final solution. We can integrate deleted records after anonymization, 
and then we obtain a new file with two levels of detail depending of the rareness of 
each stay. 
 
In this test, maximum threshold of outliers is fixed to 4%.  
 
Table 5 illustrates an example of solution corresponding to the threshold 3.8% (650 388 
records are outliers). The first step is to extract outliers corresponding to one solution from 
the original dataset. Then we anonymize outliers by applying the same process. It is obvious 
that information provided for outliers is less detailed. This approach differs slightly from a 
method with local suppression because here the information provided is the same for all 
outliers.  
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Name of variable Type of variable Level of generalization 
  For the outliers For other stays 
Sex Indirect identifier Cleartext Cleartext 
Age Indirect identifier Five-year age groups 
(level 1) 
Five-year age groups 
(level 1) 
Residential area Indirect identifier NUTS3 level NUTS3 level 
FINESS number Indirect identifier Not disseminated NUTS2 level 
Length of hospital stay Indirect identifier Not disseminated Level 1 
Major category of diagnosis Sensitive variable Cleartext Cleartext 
Table 5 One file that meets anonymization goals with two levels of detail depending on the 
rareness of a stay 
 
The file described in Table 5 has strictly more utility than the previous one because 
information provided for non-outliers is more detailed: data about place of hospitalization 
and duration of the stay may be disseminated for records with a low risk of re-identification. 
5 Discussion 
Given the non-uniform distribution of indirect identifiers shown in Section 3, building k-
anonymized files is very hard without using any perturbative method because of the rareness 
of some modalities of indirect identifiers. See Sweeney (2000) for another example with 
demographic data. The loss of utility is very high when making global recoding. In 
particular, we didn’t manage to obtain safe files with two geographical dimensions 
(residence and hospitalization areas). Even in the file described in Table 5, there is no 
information about place of hospitalization for the outliers. 
 
Both software of this test are quite easy to use with an intuitive interface and handle very 
large datasets like the French PMSI file - more than 20 million records. After generation of 
the microdata file and computation of frequencies for all identification keys that are time-
consuming, other steps of the anonymization process are done instantly with µ-Argus. The 
anonymization process (comparison of all possible combinations of generalization 
hierarchies) consists in less than 2 minutes with ARX. 
 
µ-Argus is a flexible program where all parameters of the SDC process can be controlled, 
there is no “black-box” effect and the documentation about the software is detailed. ARX has 
apparently more functionalities and anonymization criteria than µ-Argus like l-diversity (that 
can be checked directly during the SDC process), t-closeness and δ-presence. However 
documentation is limited and it is sometimes hard to use some functionalities: in particular, 
there is only little documentation about metrics used to choose one generalization hierarchy 
by minimizing information loss. 
 
Some steps are not optimized in µ-Argus and ARX. For instance there is no way to compute 
optimal global recoding in order to minimize information loss under the constraint of getting 
a k-anonymized file. Some algorithms are described in the literature (see Lefevre (2006) 
about the Mondrian algorithm) but they are not implemented in the software used in this test. 
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Moreover it is not easy to add utility constraints when using this kind of algorithm. For 
instance, we do not want to recode a geographical variable by regrouping some areas that are 
very far away from each other. That’s why all methods presented in this paper consist in 
iterative empirical approaches in order to reach k-anonymization and l-diversity. 
6 Concluding remarks 
We can see in this study that it is hard to reach a good trade-off between disclosure risk and 
data utility when protecting a microdata file using neither perturbative methods nor local 
suppression. All files proposed in this test for dissemination suffer from a huge loss of data 
utility, despite the large number of records in the original PMSI file of hospital stays in 2012. 
Two methods to obtain a 10-anonymized and 3-diverse file were presented: the former with 
“pure” global recoding, the latter with different levels of generalization according to the 
power of re-identification of each record.  
 
In further work it should be interesting to analyze disclosure risk and associated loss of 
information when perturbing data, for instance with qualitative microaggregation (see also 
Hundepool (2012) for a definition of microaggregation). Using geographical information for 
perturbation seems to be a good idea because it is easier with this kind of variable to control 
the perturbation and the associated loss of information compared to a non-ordinal variable 
like patient sex. Lastly, values of k and l were fixed in this study: it might be of interest to 
perform tests with other values and study resulting data utility and residual disclosure risk. 
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Appendix 
 
Tool Issuer Open 
source 
Main functions HIPAA 
compliance 
Frequent 
updates 
Observations 
µ-Argus 
 
Statistics 
Netherlands 
No (a next 
release will 
be open 
source) 
Global recoding 
Local suppression 
Top and bottom 
coding Post 
Randomization 
Additive noise 
Microaggregation 
Numerical Rank 
Swapping 
No No Widely used by 
National 
Statistical 
Institutes, several 
perturbative and 
not perturbative 
protection 
methods 
implemented 
See also Section 
2.1 
ARX Munich 
University 
Yes  k-anonymity, l-
diversity, t-
closeness and δ-
presence 
No Yes Helps in the 
creation of 
generalization 
hierarchies, helps 
in exploring the 
domain of 
solutions, helps in 
comparing 
original data with 
transformed one 
See also Section 
2.2 
sdcMicro8 Vienna 
University of 
technology 
Yes Microaggregation, 
noise, swapping, 
local suppression, 
partially synthetic 
data 
No Yes Cannot handle 
extremely large 
datasets, test-
oriented tool, it is 
a R package 
PARAT9 Privacy 
Analytics 
Inc. 
No, but 
demo is 
available 
after 
requesting 
access and 
registration 
Implements 
comprehensive risk 
management for 
three types of 
identity disclosure 
risk, evaluates data 
utility, suppression, 
data shifting across 
several databases, 
Yes Yes Combines 
masking and de-
identification 
techniques, 
Simulates attacks 
to determine 
levels of risk 
associated with 
the re-
identification, 
                                                 
8
 Available online at http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/sdcMicro 
9
 Available online at http://www.himss.org/News/NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=29971  
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etc. Integrates two 
expert systems 
(ERB & IRB) to 
assist risk 
evaluation 
CAT10 Cornell 
University 
Yes k-anonymity, 
Incognito, l-
diversity, risk 
analyzer 
No No Usability 
problem, lack of 
documentation, 
buggy tool 
UTD11 University of 
Texas 
(Dallas) 
Yes k-anonymity, 
Datafly, Mondrian 
Multidimensional, 
Incognito, 
Incognito with l-
diversity and t-
closeness 
No No More developer 
oriented than final 
user oriented tool, 
Java 
implementations 
And several other tools: Oracle Data Masking, Camouflage, Informatica Data Privacy, Data Masker or 
IBM Optim Data Privacy Solution, etc. 
Table A.1 Some available de-identification tools. 
 
 
 
Level Age (years) Sex 
4 * * 
3 [0-39] ... ... ... * 
2 0 [1-4] [5-14] ... ... ... ... ... ... * 
1 0 [1-4] [5-9] [10-14] ... ... ... ... ... ... * 
0 0 1 … 4 5 … 9 10 … 14 15 … 39 40 … … 1 2 
Table A.2 Examples of generalization hierarchy: attributes “Age” and “Sex” 
 
 
 
Level Length of hospital stay (days) 
4 * 
3 * 
2 0 [1-2] … [5-6] [7-10] +11 
1 0 1 2 … 5 6 [7-8] [9-10] [11-14] [15-29] +30 
0 0 1 2 … 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 … 14 15 … 29 30 … 
Table A.3 Example of generalization hierarchy: attribute “Length of hospital stay” 
 
                                                 
10
 Available online at http://sourceforge.net/projects/anony-toolkit  
11
 Available online at http://cs.utdallas.edu/dspl/cgi-bin/toolbox  
